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Over the past decade, constitutional scholar Michael J. Perry has
struggled with the question of what role religion can and should play in the
public policy of a liberal democracy such as the United States.' While some
on the left want "God talk" hermetically sealed off from all political
debates,' many on the right would build the city of God on the foundation
of the U.S. Capitol.3 Perry consistently has provided a reasoned and
illuminating voice in the middle, respecting both the importance of religion
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1. Perry previously has suggested a balance between liberalism and religious conservatism by
urging the religious right to bring only its "accessible," moderate views into public political
debate. See MIcHAFL J. PERRY, LovE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS (1991). Religion in Politics represents the culmination of Perry's rethinking
of the role that religious views should play in politics. See also Michael J. Perry, Religious
Morality and Political Choice: Further Thoughts-and Second Thoughts-on Love and Power,
30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 703 (1993) (arguing that public debate should be more open to different
types of religious arguments than he had suggested in his earlier works).
2. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995)
(arguing that religious arguments in public debate divide people by making those who do not
share the same beliefs as the majority feel excluded); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
(1993); Bruce A. Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5, 16 (1989) ("We should.., put the
moral ideas that divide us off the conversational agenda of the liberal state."). Perry offers
extended and persuasive point-by-point responses to Greenawalt (pp. 49-54) and Rawls (pp. 54-
61).
3. See, e.g., T.R. Reid, Republicans Rue Mecham's Return; Arizonan's Maneuvers
Embarrassing National Party Leaders, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1989, at 12 (reporting that
Arizona's Republican Party declared the United States to be "a Christian nation" and that the
U.S. Constitution created "a republic based upon the absolute laws of the Bible, not a
democracy"); Gayle White, A "World View" Based on the Bible, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 25,
1992, at E6 (describing a Christian Reconstructionist belief that the Bible dictates establishing
theocracy).
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to the believer and the need for a government of and for all the people,
religious and nonreligious alike.
In Religion in Politics, Perry advocates a greater role for religious ideas
in policymaking, arguing that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
require the judiciary to accept a very deferential stance toward laws
justified by religious arguments. To be sure, Perry continues to have a
healthy regard for nonestablishment as a principle; yet his permissive
attitude toward the role of religion in legislation and judicial review
fundamentally underprotects the democratic value of nonestablishment,
transforming the shield of free exercise into a sword for privileging the
majority's religious views.
I
Perry's argument starts with the uncontroversial suggestion that the
Free Exercise Clause prevents government from penalizing the expression
of religious belief in public debate (p. 32). The truly difficult questions
begin when religious beliefs form part-or all--of the basis for the political
choice. Perry views free exercise as an antidiscrimination command,
prohibiting government action that disfavors one religion or religion
generally because of its religious nature (p. 13).' Perry goes further,
interpreting free exercise as also requiring the "accommodation" of
religious practice. Under this position, generally applicable laws that do not
serve a compelling public purpose would require an exemption for religious
practice (p. 30). The nonestablishment principle is also a governmental
antidiscrimination command, but instead of prohibiting the disfavoring of
religion as free exercise does, nonestablishment prohibits favoring religion
because of its religious nature (pp. 15-16).
Perry ultimately synthesizes his characterizations of the religion clauses
into a general rule that government may not make judgments about the
"value or disvalue-the moral value, the truth value, the social value" of
religion or religious practices as such (p. 14). Actions disfavoring religious
practices (violating the free exercise norm) and favoring religious practices
(establishment violations) send the message, endorsed and effectuated by
the government, that one religious idea, faith, or practice is better or worse
than another.' But what happens if a public policy choice is motivated by
4. But cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) ("We have never held that
an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.").
5. This position closely tracks the "endorsement" test developed by Justice O'Connor in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the
government violates the Establishment Clause by excessive entanglement with religion or by
"endorsement or disapproval" of religion).
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both a secular and religious justification?6 Perry argues that a government
policy choice violates the nonestablishment norm only when no plausible
secular purpose supports the choice (p. 34). If a secular purpose is
plausible, the decision does not violate the Establishment Clause, regardless
of whether the actual purpose-the cause in fact-was religiousin nature
(p. 34).' Only where a religious purpose alone could have motivated a
decision does that decision send an impermissible message favoring
religion.
Perry views this balance-allowing religious justifications if there is
also a plausible secular justification-as preferable for two reasons. First,
courts would not need to substitute their own definitions of what constitutes
a sufficient secular reason for those of the legislature. Second, this balance
would rescue decisions motivated in fact by secular justifications that
coincide with religious purposes where those religious motivations were
unnecessary to the decision (p. 35). Perry readily admits that his position
represents an "underenforcement" of the nonestablishment norm, but he
considers this position preferable "as a practical matter" (p. 35).8
II
The structure and nature of Perry's theory of judicial review
underprotects the nonestablishment norm even while laudably protecting
free exercise. A too-deferential court fails to fulfill the minority-protecting
function of the judiciary described in United States v. Carolene Products.9
6. Controversial examples abound. The posting of the Ten Commandments on a classroom
wall, intended as a lesson about Western law rather than as a religious display, is one example.
See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). Requiring public schools to teach creationism
whenever evolution is taught, ostensibly to protect academic freedom rather than to favor the
creationist account, is another. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
7. Perry urges the faithful to show restraint by exercising their legislative power only when,
in their view, a persuasive secular rationale supports a decision they would make on religious
grounds.
8. Perry does not detail how his construction of the religion clauses would result in different
outcomes in constitutional cases, but it seems certain that he would at least come out differently
from the Aguillard Court, which overturned an Arkansas state law requiring the teaching of
"creation science" whenever scientific evolution was taught. See 482 U.S. at 595-97. In fact, the
case presented a plausible secular purpose: the balancing of religion and science. Perry
sympathizes with Justice Scalia's dissenting argument that students should be permitted to
"decide for themselves, based upon a fair presentation." Id. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Among
more current issues, Perry argues that abortion could be banned on secular grounds without
violating the nonestablishment norm, but that prohibitions of legally recognized same-sex
marriages cannot be. Although antiabortion advocates often rely on religious arguments, Perry
points out that some prominent Catholics have advanced a secular reason to outlaw abortion (pp.
70-72), while the ban on same-sex marriages relies entirely on religious belief (pp. 82-85).
9. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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A. Freedom from the Majority's Religion
In Carolene Products, the Court announced its view that legislative
decisions demonstrating "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities ... may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry." 0 Further, the opinion recommends aggressive judicial review
when "legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments." " The Court's
judicial review power therefore is strongest in correcting defects in the
democratic process and in enforcing enumerated constitutional guarantees,
including religious liberty, against the majority.
12
Perry does not ignore the role of the religion clauses in promoting a
well-functioning democracy. His standard, however, constrains the Court
from considering impermissible religious motivation where the majority
privileges its religious view and a plausible-though not persuasive-
secular reason also supports the decision. Perry's two central propositions
regarding free exercise prevent the courts from aggressively rooting out
religious or even sectarian favoritism in legislation. First, free exercise
means the courts cannot punish religious faithful for their "God talk"
during legislative debates by considering their statements as evidence of an
impermissible motivation. From a litigation view, this reduces the chance
that a plaintiff could prove that an impermissible religious motive drove the
passage of a bill.13 Second, any plausible secular purpose can validate a law
even though the actual purpose was religious. This signals something like
rational basis review where governmental actors imagine some reason,




12. The paradigmatic religious liberty cases center on protecting minorities from coercive
majority action of two types. First, free exercise protects religious minorities from interference by
the majority representing either no religion or other religions. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that free exercise protects minority religion that holds Saturday as
Sabbath from penalty in qualifying for government benefits). Second, nonestablishment protects
religious and nonreligious minorities from the coercive use of their government and tax money to
aid a majority religion. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1946). In addition
to these tangible harms, one can argue that a deeper injury is inflicted in both types of cases when
the majority communicates through the government the message that the minority is not part of
mainstream society. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.").
13. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-57 (1985) (relying on a legislator's
extensive pro-religion remarks as evidence of an impermissible religious purpose).
14. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), and Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1981),
provide examples of how Perry's deferential standard jeopardizes nonestablishment on a practical
level. The state law in Edwards had the effect of promoting a religious view (hut for the law, the
view would not have been heard in hundreds of classrooms) and seriously entangling government
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Because a theory of judicial review entails majority-approved
legislation, the deferential position Perry advocates can benefit only those
religious people able to muster majorities, not those permanently relegated
to minority status or even disinterested in political action. A conception of
free exercise that privileges the majority in this way turns the Carolene
Products justification of judicial review on its head: Those able to
command majorities get the protection of the Court, while those too weak
to have a voice in the democratic process do not. In this way, the higher
constitutional law principles that should protect political minorities would
be hamstrung by a compliant judiciary.
B. Carolene Products and Diffuse or Anonymous Minorities
Countering the Carolene Products defense of judicial review, Bruce
Ackerman has argued convincingly that diffuse and anonymous minorities-far
more than "discrete and insular" ones--stand a greater risk of harm by majority
indifference."5 Discrete and insular minorities, such as racial and ethnic groups,
typically are able to marshal significant political power within a pluralistic
process because of their ability to coalesce and organize.16 In contrast,
anonymous or dispersed minorities, such as the victims of sexual discrimination
or poverty, face a greater risk of constitutional disregard because they are less
able to find a voice within the process, organize politically, and push for
inclusion.'" In this group, one might include atheists, agnostics, and the
religiously indifferent,"8 who, despite their lack of interest in free exercise, may
have a true concern with nonestablishment on both political and cultural levels.
with religion (through government-employed teachers' use of the doctrine and authorities'
monitoring and enforcing the law). Such a law fails the Court's purpose test, see Edwards, 482
U.S. at 594 (holding that the law's "primary purpose" of endorsing religion-despite the presence
of a secondary secular purpose-violates the Establishment Clause), as well as the entanglement
aspect of O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Yet just
as in Stone, where the display of the Ten Commandments ostensibly demonstrated the foundation
of Western law, a court bound by the plausible secular justification standard of review could
hardly find the statute deficient on establishment grounds, despite the obvious benefit to a
particular religion. The argument that such statutes do not establish religion if the religious
messages are presented antiseptically without an endorsement of the "value or disvalue" (p. 14)
of the messages ignores the obvious effect of promoting the dissemination of a particular
(majority-held) religious message.
15. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REV. 713, 737 (1985)
("It is the members of anonymous or diffuse groups who, in the future, will have the greatest
cause to complain that pluralist bargaining exposes them to systematic-and undemocratic-
disadvantage."); see also id. at 742 ("After a generation of renewed struggle for civil rights, it no
longer follows that the discreteness or insularity of a group will continue to serve as a decisive
disadvantage in... pluralist bargaining.").
16. See id. at 723-24.
17. See id. at 729.
18. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act violates nonestablishment by favoring
religious people).
The Yale Law Journal
While Perry justifiably expresses concern over the free exercise rights
of religious groups, tipping the balance in favor of religious practice over
freedom from religion raises the minority-protection problem Ackerman
foresaw. The enactment in 1993 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), 9 which granted exemptions from general laws for religious
activities, provides an example of the conflict between free exercise and
nonestablishment. RFRA's passage reflected the lobbying of a coalition of
different faiths and some civil libertarians concerned with what they viewed
as an encroachment on free exercise.2° The coalition demonstrated the type
of lawmaking implicated by Perry's deferential judicial review model:
Motivated by a desire to protect acts of religious conscience-a religious
purpose-religious groups banded together to enact legislation. Yet, as
Justice Stevens succinctly stated, RFRA violated the nonestablishment
norm by granting favors only to the religious: "[T]he statute has provided
the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This
governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden
by the First Amendment."21 While Carolene Products may not require
aggressive review in the absence of prejudice against a discrete and insular
minority, the vulnerability of diffused or anonymous minorities justifies
stronger protection.
Perry's model argues for the opposite result, a deferential review
validating a law with a thin secular justification. He argues that lawmakers
may act to protect all acts of conscience from the burden of neutral,
generally applicable laws without violating nonestablishment (p. 29). This
would be a secular reason that in no way prefers religion. By enacting
RFRA, Congress protected acts of religious conscience, but only because
the Free Exercise Clause protects religious acts and not all acts of
conscience. It would be extreme, in Perry's view, to suggest that
nonestablishment prohibits the protection of religious practice merely
because free exercise favors religion (p. 29). Would Congress's concern
with protecting all acts of conscience constitute a plausible secular
justification through a law giving special exemptions to religious practice?
Whether RFRA itself could be defended under Perry's "plausibility"
standard is debatable, but at a minimum it shows the need for aggressive
judicial review in defining and defending constitutional norms in ways not
contemplated by Carolene Products.
-Kevin Metz
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(bb)-(bb)(4) (1994).
20. See Gustav Niebuhr, Disparate Groups Unite Behind Civil Rights Bill on Religious
Freedom, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1993, at A7.
21. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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